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Price Level Determinacy with an Interest Rate Policy Rule and Rational Ecpectations
ABSTRACT
Thispaper reconsiders a result obtained by Sargent and Wallace, namely,
thatpricelevel indeterminacy obtains in their well-known model if the monetary
authorities adopt a policy feedback rule for the interest rate rather than the
money stock. Since the Federal Reserve seems often to have used the federal
funds rate as its operating instrument, with the money stack determined by the
quantity demanded, this result suggests that the Sargent-Wallace model --as
well as others incorporating rational expectations --isinconsistent with U.S.
experience. It is here shown, however, that the indeterminacy result vanishes
if the interest rate rule is chosen so as to have sonie desired effect on the
expected quantity of money demanded. This revised conclusion holds even if
considerable weight is given, in the choice of a rule, to the aim of smoothing
interest rate fluctuations.
Bennett T. McCallum





It would be unreasonable to argue that the Sargent—Wallace (1975)
paper, "'Rational' Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and
the Optimal Money Supply Rule," has been neglected by theprofession;
in fact, it has been frequently cited by both admirers and critics.
Virtually all of the attention, however, has been devoted to its policy—
ineffectiveness or "neutrality" result: that, in the rather orthodox
IS—LM—NRPc modelconsidered, the "probability distribution of output
is [with rational expectations] independent of the particulardetermin-
istic money supply rule in effect" (1975, p. 241).By contrast,
practically no attentIon has been devoted to the paper's second major
conclusion: that, in the same model and again with rationalexpectations,
"under an interest rate rule the price level is indeterminate"(1975,
p. 241). Indeed, the only discussions of this result that I have seen
are in Sargent's own Macroeconomic Theory (1979, pp. 360—363) and in very
recent papers by Taylor (1979) and Turnovsky (1980). The purpose of
the present paper, accordingly, is to discuss and reconsider this second
result of the Sargent—Wallace (S—W) analysis.
The empirical relevance of an interest rate rule is, it would seem,
undeniable; knowledgeable observers of the U.S. monetary policy behavior agree
that the federal funds rate, rather than some measure of aggregate reserves,
has been used for substantial periods of time as the Fed's operating policy
2/ instrument.—To accept this view, itmightbe added, is not to deny that the
FCdhas been serious in its professed desire to influence the (Ml)moneystock
or some other aggregate, but simply to recognize that this influence has been
effected by setting the interest rate period—by—period at levels that
—1——2—
are expected to make the quantity demanded of money (or the relevant
monetary aggregate) equal to the desired amount, perhaps modified to
keep interest rates from moving torapidly. Since observations on the
money stock are cbtained with substantial lags, the Fed must of necessity
seek to control it by setting either an interest rate or a reserve
variable; in fact it has used theformer)-'
The relevance of the Sargent—Wallace model with the rationality
assumption is perhaDs more controversial. But the aggregate demand
(IS and LM). portions of •the model are highly orthodox, and the Phillips
curve or aggregate supply function is quite representative of relation-
ships found in "practical" macroec000metric models designed to describe
the economy of the United States)' Indeed, it is because the Sargent—
Wallace structure cas basically orthodox that their neutrality conclusion
was viewed by the profession as so striking.
How, then, is one to interpret the Sargent—Wallace price—level
indeterminacy result? While a few economists might be tempted to use
it as an "explanation" of recent price level behavior, I believe that
would be inappropriate: the result says that the price level is not defined,
not that it is high or rapidly rising. What the result seems to suggest,
empirically, is erratic movements in both upward and downward directions of
the price level (and the money stock). Consequently, the appropriate con-
clusion might appear to be that the SargentWallace model with expectational
rationality provides a seriously misleading picture of the U.S. economy.
Indeed, it might appear that the indeterminacy result provides the basis for
an empirical refutation of a wide class of rational expectationsmodels!
But that conclusion, too, would be unwarranted. The reason is that,—3—
despite appearances, the S—W result is notentirelygeneral; i.e., does
not apply to all interest rate rules. In fact, it does riot apply to
rules in which the rate is set so as to influence the money stock, as is
done by the Fed. Only if the ultimate effects on money are entirely
disregarded in the design of the rule does the indeterminacy prevail.
The purpose of the following sections is to establish the validity of
this claim.—4.—
II. The Model
in the discussion that fo1los, the basic an1ytical context will
be the slightly modified version of the S—W model: used in Sargent's (1979)
more recent exposition. Accordingly, let us begin with the following
specifications of the IS,LM, andNC functions:
(1) b +bi[r — - pr)]+v', b1
<0
(2) m —p.c + c1r + c9 + C1 <0<
(3) a0 +a1(p —Eip)+a2Yi +
Here Pt and are logarithms of output, the price level, andthe
moneystock, while r i thenominal rate of interest. The operator
denotes the expectation of the indicated variable within the model
at hand and conditional upon values of all variables in periods t—l
and earlier. The stochastic variables u,Vt andaregenerated by
whitenoise processes and are independent of past values of all variables.
It might be noted that the S—W paper expresses the real interest rate
in the IS function as r —Et +E1p ,ratherthan
—Elt+l +p .Thisleads one to ask whichspecificationis appropriate.
In a macroeconomic model of the S—W type, EiP represents an average
across individual agents or markets of agents' perceptions of the current
aggregate price level, while Pt represents an average over agents or
markets of "local' prices. Consequently, if the expected inflation rate
thatagentsuse to convert nominal into real interest rates, for decision—5—
making purposes, is one that involves current and anticipated future
local prices, then the formulation in (1) will be appropriate.!! Another
specificational issue is whether wealth terms should also be included in
(l) The presence of a real money—balance term, —
Pt,would not
affect the results in any significant way and so can be omitted for
simplicity. The presence of a term reflecting private holdings of
government bonds, on the other hand, would eliminate the price level
indeterminacy. To see that this is true in a static classical
model is an extremely simple exercise and a useful extension to a dynamic
setting more like that of Sargent—Wallace was recently provided by
Turnovsky (1980). It is, however, debatable whether bonds should be
modelled as constituting net wealth to the private sector; the contrary
"Ricardian" view (that the capitalized value of implied future tax
liabilities precisely offsets the value of currant bond holdings) ha
been given important support by Barro (1974). [n any event, one object
of the present paper is to show that determinacy does not require valid-
ity of the non—Ricardian view. Consequently, wealth terms will be
omitted in the subsequent analysis.
The object in what follows will be to derive equations representing
the stochastic behavior ofp under various specifications of policy,
all of which presume that the monetary authority's behavior is represent-
able as a linear feedback rule forr. In conducting the analysis, I
shall use the "dtd coefficients" procedure introduced into the
macroeconomic literature by Lucas (1972). In this way it will be
possible to express the S—W indeterminacy result in a different, and—6—
perhapsintuitively appeaLing, wayand also to obLain—w.t1! -oniu1os- of
generality——greaterexplicitness in our new result.
Before turning to •the analysis, however, it will be useful to
simplify the model even further. Since output is, in this model.,
independent of policy, its behavior is basically irrelevant to the issues
at hand. Thus nothing of importance will be lost, and considerable
computational simplicity will be gained, if we simply treat output as a'
constant. With this done, we can (by appropriate definitions of h0,
c0,and v) express the model as
(1') r b0 +Et lPt+i Pt+
(2') m Pt +c0 + c1r+
plusa policy rule for rt.
As one more preliminary point, let us note that nothing would be
gained by appending to the model a money supply function reflecting
hank behavior, such as
(4) =h++ v1r+
whereh is a reserve aggregate and a disturbance. For with
determined by a policy rule, (4) would simply explain h with the variables
of major macroeconomic interest determined by the system (O—(3) or
(i'),(2'). Furthermore, there would be no point in interpreting
as (e.g.) the treasury bill rate and introducing a separate variable
forthefederalfunds rate——which would then enter (4) as a distinct
argument——if the model were then closed with an"efficientmarkets'
relation such as—6 a—
(5)r
+ + t
withwhitenoise, etc. The reason is that,. clearly, this last
equation makes any discrepancy between rt random and uiiinteresting
Consequently, most analyses of the instrument problem have been
9/ conducted in models with only one interest rate.——7—
III.The Sargent—Wallace Result
Let us now develop our version of the S—W indeterminacy result.
Given our use of the undetermined coefficients approach, it isnecessary
tospecify the variables that appear in the authority's policy rule for
r. To keep the analysis as simple as possible,letus consider the
deterministic rule
(6)r + p1r1
where p0.andp1wouldpresumably be positive. As in McCallum (1978),
the analysis proceedsby using the mGdel'slinearity and the white noise
propertyof thedisturbances to expressPt and m as reduced—form functions
ofthe sole predetermined variabler1 and the current disturbances.
Thus for appropriate values of the 1T• parameters we have
(7a) p + 11r1 +ri2v+
(7b) 20 + 21r1 + ÷
Andour immediate object, necessary for understanding the dynamic behavior
of p and m ,isto determine the values of the ii.coefficients interms t t
ofthe basic parameters appearing in (1'), (2'), and (6).
As a preliminary step, note that
(8)Eip+1rio + r1iiE1rn10 + r11(p0 + piri)
Thenputting (6), (7a), and (8) into(1') we obtainputting (6), (7a), and (7b) i:o(2')yields














Butfor this equation to hold for arbitrarY: values of the system's





















Mow, in a well—behaved system the eight equations in (10) and (12)
could be used to evaluate the eight coefficients, lrlcJ•• 23 In the
case at hand, however, we cart see by inspection that 2O and a10 appear
only in the first of equatiois (12) ,andthere as the difference 2O —
Thusthe model says. nothing about the magnitudes of r 2O separately.
Consequently, there is nothing to pin down either Pt or msothe
indeterminacy result can be seen t.o prevail.
Furthermore the second of equations (10) gives r11p1/(p1 —1)
while the first implies 7111 (p, —b0)/p0
.Butp0. p1. and b0 are
independent behavioral parameters so this amounts to an inconsistency in
the model. This result is reminiscent of Sargent's observations regarding
the consequence of a pegged interest rate in a textbook—style classical
model (1979, pp. 9495).— 1_U—
IV.Analysiswith Revised Polity Rule
Our object now is to respecify the interest rate rule ina way that
will make it more "realistic," i.e., will make it morenearly representa-
tive of actual Fed behavior as described above. The crucialaspct to
be emphasized is that the rule is chosen notarbitrarily, but so as to
provide some desired effect on the quantity ofmoney demanded. The
purest case would be that in which the policy rule forr is designed
to make the expected value of equal to some target value such as
(13) m u0+
with presumably positive. In this pure case the rule would be to set
r equal t.o the value
(14) r=c1)(0+j1r1 —c0
—E1p)
which makes the expected value of money demand equal tom .Ofcourse
this rule differs from the type considered by S—W because itscoefficients
depend (via E1p) on behavioral parameters of the model, but itcan
still be expressed as a feedback rule.
More general than the foregoing is the case in which, instead of
(14) ,therule is
(15)r(/c1)(j0 + i1r — c0-Etip+ (1—
with0 < < 1.Clearly thisspecification saysthat the monetary
authoritysets r with some weightgiven to the target vaue ofm, hut
with weight also given to the objective of interestrate smoothing (i.e.,the avoidance of fluctuations in re). Thus the smaller is the value of
•, the less weight is given to the attainment of the target value nitand
the more weight is given to smoothing. Since this formulation is perhaps
more realistic than (14), and includes (14) as a special case, we shall
now assume po3ic behavior as specified in (15).
Analysis of the model (1'), (2'), (15) begins with the computations
(16) E_1t. —"10+ w11r_1
117E " — + Sr tl"t+1 "10 'ii t—l t
— +
(v11/c1) (p0 +p1r1 —c0
a — n11r_1)+ zii(l
—
Thenwe substitute (15), (16), (17), and (7a) into (1'), obtaining:
(18) ($/c1)(p0 + u1r_1 —o
—t;irt_j)
+ (1 —t r_1
—




(p10+nllrt_l + irjft + +
The implied equalities are then:
(19)(4/c1)(p0 —c0
— —
b0+ + (n114/c1)(p0 —
c0
— — rio




From these last two we immediately obtain 1 and IT130,while
the second i a quadratic equation in
fl11,viz.,
(20) - +c1(l — - -c111
From the latter we obtain
(21)
IT11(1/2)[(1+ i c1)i+ -
c12
- - c1+ c1/)
In order to tell which root is relevant, consider the special case in
which =1and 0. In this caseri does not appear in the







c1is a positive number, (22) gives
iT11= Oforthe negative square
root. Therefore, we conclude that the smaller root is generally relevant
10/ in (21), which then determines





Thuswe see that all of the coefficients in (7a) are well defined by
the model. With the interest rate rule (L5), the price level is
determinate in the S—W model.




















Inspection shows these to be sufficient to determine the coefficients in
(7b) so is also determinate.
It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the foregoing- result implies
a determinate price, level even when values ofare small; i.e., when
the authority emphasizes interest rate smoothing and attends to its
monetary target only slightly. Only for .O does' the indeterminacy
result prevail. It is in that respect that indeterminacy obtains only
if the rule's effects on money are tentire1y disregarded,' as claimed
above.
In conclusion, itshould perhaps be emphasized that the foregoing
result does not formally contradict the Sargent—Wallace conclusion, for their
analysis presumes that the parameters in the interest rate teedhac.k rule
are autonomous——i. e. ,unrelat ed to behavioral parameters -Butrules of
the general type described in (15) would seem to he o[ greater practical—14—
relevance. And the existence of interest rate rules of that type
provide, as e have seen, no basis for concluding that the S—W model
or other rational expectations models are inconsistent with data recently
generated by the U.S. economy. Finally, it should be said that the
foregoing discussion suggests that use of an interest rate instrument
is feasible, not that It is desirable.—15—
Appendix
The object here is to show that the deterrninacy result of Section 4
remains intact under the alternative versions of the IS function mentioned
in footnote 8. First, if (1') is replaced with
(1") r b0 + EP÷i —Pt+ Vt




Thesecond of these yields r11 in a manner analogous to (20) in
Section 4, which permits determination o.f from the first.
Next, if the Sargent—Wallace IS function is used .with the deter-
ministic policy rule (15) and output is treated as a constant, the
disturbance v must be removed from (1') and thus from (7). The
solution is then as in Section 4 except that =0.(Use of the
more complete supply function (3), even with a2 =0,would of course
permit retention of vt.)Footnotes
--'Here NRPC is an abbreviation for "naturalrate Phillips curve."
-'See, for example, Friedman (1977), Kareken and Miller (1976), Lombra
and Torto (1975), Poole (1975), and Volcker (1978).
-'Perhaps a reserve instrument has been used since October 6, 1979 ——that
remains to be seen. In any event, the federal funds rate was used during
much of the postwar period prior to that date.
-'This view, that aggregate demand specifications of the IS—LM type are
used by most macroeconomists, is evidently shared by Friedman (1970) and
Modigliani (1977).
—'See McCallum (1979).
have not been able to delineate the class rigorously, but it appears
that the indeterminacy result holds for most (perhaps all) models with
rational expectations and sensible steady—state properties. One example
of a model iith the indeterminacy but without the "policy ineffectiveness"
property is that of Phelps and Taylor (1977). Thus the price eve1 indeter-
minacy feature might even be regarded as reason for rejecting expectational
rationality.
have used different symbols for parameters and have not constrained
the income elasticity of money demand to be unity, as does Sargent (1979,
p. 360).-7-
Thisconclusioncan be obtained more rigorously in the context of an
'tisland model" of the type used by Lucas (1973). If there exists a security
traded in all localities so that agents observe an economy—wide interest
rate, the S—W neutrality result will riot hold, for reasons described by
Earro(1979). Conclusions relevant to the present discussion remain intact,
however, and these also hold if theS—Wformulation, with
—E +Etip
,isused.The relevant anaylsis is sketched in the
appendix.
See, e.g., Friedman (1977), Pierce and Thomson (1972), and Poole(1970).
the larger root were chosen then (22) would givell =— c1









asthe reduced form equation for Pt Substitution into the policy rule
(15) would yield, after simplification, r. =(b01c1)
—[(1—c1)/c1Ir1
Since c1 <0,thecoefficient on r1 in the latter exceeds 1.0.
Thus the implied behavior of is explosive, even though the target
money stock is constant and the price level is white noise. This result
is analogous to ones in which the price level explodes with a constant
money stock. (For a discussiOn, see Flood and Carber (1980).) Some
authors have ruled out such solutions, using the explosive behavior as a
justification. The rationale employed here ——thata variable which
appears nowhere in the model should not appear in reduced—form equations ——
seemspreferable.—18—
References
Barro, R.J., 1974, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? Journal of Political
Economy 82, November/December, 1095—1117.
Barro, R.J., 1979, Developments in the Equilibrium Approach to Business
Cycles, University of Rochester and NBER, July.
Flood, R.P., and P.M. Garber, 1980, Market Fundamentals vs. Price Level
Bubbles: The First Tests, Journal of Political Economy 88, forthcoming.
Friedman, M., 1970, A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis, Journal
of Political Economy 78, March/April, 193—238.
Friedman, B., 1977, The Inefficiency of Short—Run Monetary Targets for
Monetary Policy, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 293—335.
Kareken, J.FI..,andP.J. Miller, 1976, The Policy Procedure of the FOMC:
A Critique, in A Prescription for Monetary Policy: Proceedings from
a Seminar Series (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis).
Loipbra, R.E., and R.G. Torto, 1975, The Strategy of Monetary Policy,
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Monthly Review, Sept./Oct., 3—14.
Lucas, R.E., Jr., 1972, Econometric Testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis,
in The Econometrics of Price Determination Conference, ed. by0.
Eckstein. (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
Lucas, R.E., Jr., 1973, Some International Evidence on Output—Inflation
Tradeoffs, American Economic Review 63, June, 326—334.
McCallum, B.T., 1978, Price Level Adjustments and the Rational Expectations
Approach to Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy, Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 10, Nov., 418—436.
McCallum, B.T., 1979, Monetarlsm, Rational Expectations, Oligopolist-ic
Pricing, and the MPS Econometric Model, Journal of Political Economy
87, Feb., 57—73.—19--
Modigliani, F., 1977, The Monetarist Controversy or, Should We Forsake
Stabilization Policies? American Economic Review 67, March, 1—19.
Phelps, E.S., and J.B. Taylor, 1977, Stabilizing Powers of Monetary
Policy Under Rational Expectations, Journal of Political Economy
85, Feb., 163—190.
Pierce, J.L., and T.D. Thomson, 1972, Some Issues in Controlling the Stock
of Money, in Controlling Monetary Aggregates II: The Implementation.
(The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series No 9).
Poole, W., 1970, Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple
Macro Model, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, May, 197—216.
Poole, W., 1975, The Making of Monetary Policy: Description and Analysis,
Economic Inquiry 13, June, 253—265.
Sargent, T.J., 1979, Matroeconornic Theory. (New York: Academic Press).
Sargett, T.J., and N. Wallace, 1975, 'Rational' Expec.tations, the Optimal
Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule, Journal of
Political Economy 83, 241—254.
Taylor, J.B., 1979, Recent Developments in the Theory of Stabilization
Policy, Columbia University. November.
Turnovsky, S.J., 1980, Wealth Effects and the Determinacy of the Price
Level Under an Interest Rate Rule and Rational Expectations,
Australian National University, March.
Volcker, P.A.., 1978, The Role of Monetary Targets in an Age of Inflation,
Journal of Monetary Economics 4, April, 329—339.